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Kant's Aesthetic Idealism 
Guenter Zoeller 
KANT'S Critique of Judgment is a seminal text in philosophical reflection 
about matters of art and beauty. Yet it is also an exceedingly difficult text 
for today's reader, due to the fact that it is deeply rooted in the aesthetic 
discussion of its time, the eighteenth century, and that it forms an integral 
part of Kant's own comprehensive philosophical system. While it is fairly 
standard to explain Kant's aesthetics by comparing his views to those of 
relevant contemporaries and predecessors in the field, little attention has 
been paid to the structural similarities between Kant's aesthetics and his 
views on other philosophical matters. In the present piece I want to 
explore this somewhat neglected line of inquiry. I shall concentrate on 
Kant's basic account of the conditions and limitations of human knowl 
edge and pursue the extent of analogy between Kant's idealism regarding 
knowledge and Kant's idealism in aestheticis. 
I 
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant defends a view which he calls 
"transcendental idealism." On this view, ordinary empirical objects such 
as trees and tables have no being independent of the human mind that cog 
nizes them. Kant holds that the human mind plays an active, formative 
role in experiencing the world. The mind is shown to cognize objects by 
subjecting what is given through the senses to mental functions. The 
objects of knowledge that result from those formative processes are said to 
be indelibly marked by the activities of the human mind. Due to the 
mind's active, structuring relation to objects, we do not know things as 
they exist independent and outside of the formation they undergo through 
the mind. Put in Kant's terminology, we do not know things as they are 
"in themselves," but only as they "appear to us." 
It is important to note that Kant does not deny the reality of things 
independent of any involvement with the human mind. His point is rather 
that we cannot know anything about the absolute, mind-independent 
determinations of those objects. The things in themselves lie outside the 
sphere of what we humans can possibly experience. Conversely, every 
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thing that we do know on the basis of experience is deeply affected by our 
human ways of experiencing. Empirical objects "appear" to us under the 
forms of human cognition. Kant identifies a set of basic mental functions 
that guide the structuring of our experience. They are space and time as 
the structuring features of knowledge gained through the senses, and the 
twelve categories as the structuring features of knowledge gained through 
the understanding. Most important among the latter is the category of 
cause and effect, that organizes the rule-governed sequence of events in the 
realm of experience. 
In labeling his position "idealism," Kant indicates the relativity of empiri 
cal objects to the human mind and its principal cognitive functions. At 
points, Kant goes so far as to assert that the whole realm of experience and 
everything in it has reality only as representations in the human mind, and 
that it has no reality outside the mind. Kant's idealism, then, amounts to 
the view that all we can know is mind-dependent in that it is either the 
mind itself or something that has reality only relative to it. Kant is careful, 
though, to limit the scope of his idealism. He does not claim that every 
thing is mental; the mind-independent reality of the things in themselves 
is left untouched. It is only the empirical determinations that are ideal in 
the sense of having no reality independent of the cognitive processes. 
Kant's idealism is furthermore a transcendental idealism, viz., an idealism 
concerning things in themselves, in that it maintains that the objects we 
experience do not exist as such outside of their relation to the human 
mind. Yet Kant is not about to deny all reality to the objects of empirical 
knowledge. The determinations attributed to objects on the basis of our 
experience do indeed belong to those objects, provided that the objects are 
properly understood as being appearances and not things in themselves. In 
addition to being a transcendental idealist, who denies the absolute reality of 
empirical determinations, Kant is thus an empirical realist, who holds that 
the determinations of empirical objects according to space, time and the 
categories really pertain to those very objects. 
On Kant's view, transcendental idealism is not only compatible with 
empirical realism. To account for the reality of our empirical knowledge 
outright requires the distinction, made by transcendental idealism, 
between knowable appearances and unknowable things in themselves. 
Kant argues that our very ability to have objective knowledge presupposes 
that the objects to be known lie not outside the sphere of human experi 
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ence but within it, and hence be subject to the human conditions of know 
ing. If, by contrast, the objects to be known were assumed to be the 
things as they exist in themselves, independent of human knowledge, then 
humans would altogether fail in their cognitive efforts. Knowing only 
appearances is the price to be paid for knowing anything at all. 
One of the more elusive features of Kant's transcendental idealism is the 
claim that the formative processes taking place in cognition are invariant 
and universal functions of the human mind. While Kant concedes that the 
acts of cognition take place in individual minds, he nevertheless maintains 
that the functions underlying these processes are necessarily shared by all 
human minds.The functions in question are, in Kant's terminology, a 
priori. Accordingly, the relativity of empirical objects to the human mind is 
not to be understood as the objects' dependence on some particular mind 
or on any collection of particular minds. Rather, the relativity is said to 
pertain with regard to mind "in general." This generic nature of the for 
mative mental functions prevents Kant's idealism from turning into an 
egoism or solipsism, which maintains that there is only one being, myself. 
At least, it must be said that the ego or self on which the world of appear 
ances depends is not your or my particular "I" but some unspecific, imper 
sonal super-ego. 
II 
Kant's theory of aesthetic judgments, as developed in the Critique of Judg 
ment, suggests a transfer of the idealist conceptuality from the sphere of 
knowing to that of feeling and of judgment based on feeling. Up through 
Kant, the term "aesthetic" designates the sphere of what can be known 
through the senses. Kant's own Transcendental Aesthetic in the Critique of 
Pure Reason follows this earlier usage by treating of space and time as the 
sensory conditions of all knowledge. In the third Critique, though, the 
term "aesthetic" is not referring to sensory cognition and its conditions but 
to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, "Aesthetic" no longer designates 
"what is merely subjective in our presentations of things outside us," and 
what is 
"required for cognition of objects outside us," but rather "that 
subjective feature of a presentation which cannot at all become an element of 
cognition" (29). 
A further terminological peculiarity must be noted. In the Critique of 
Judgment the term "aesthetic" and its cognates are not limited to consid 
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erations of beauty and fine art. Rather, the aesthetic realm comprises the 
entire range of feelings or affective attitudes. "Aesthetic" characterizes a 
basic mode of relating to things, one that is radically different from the 
cognitive mode. The aesthetic mode is not a particular or strange way of 
knowing things but a way of relating to things in an entirely different, 
non-cognitive way?through feeling. In the aesthetic attitude things are 
not determined as to what they are. Rather, they are determined as to how 
they make the experiencing subject feel. Yet in spite of its distinctly non 
cognitive character, the aesthetic mode still finds expression in judgments. 
In addition to cognitive judgments that specify what is the case, Kant 
countenances aesthetic judgments that specify the subject's affective stand 
toward some object. 
The major determinations employed in aesthetic judgments include the 
predicates "agreeable," "beautiful," and "sublime," as well as the corres 
ponding negative determinations ?each predicate articulating an affective, 
emotional stand. These determinations have a peculiar double nature. On 
the one hand, they are about things: pleasure or displeasure is taken in a 
particular object or at least in the mental representation of something. On 
the other hand, the predicates in question are not so much about the object 
intended as about the experiencing mind itself. In aesthetic judgments we 
relate to the world through our capacity for feeling pleasure or displeasure. 
Aesthetic judgments are judgments made through feelings about things to 
which the mind reacts affectively. 
In assessing the idealism involved in Kant's account of aesthetic judg 
ments it must be kept in mind that all aesthetic determinations are built 
upon some cognitive relation to the world. Experiencing something as 
agreeable or as determined in any other aesthetically relevant sense requires 
that the thing in question first enter into the mind's field of awareness. 
This taking cognizance of the object in question may well be minimal. I 
do not need to know what exactly the thing I am experiencing is in order 
to 
experience it as pleasurable or displeasurable. Yet some act of cognizing 
the thing in question will always be required before I can react emotionally 
or 
affectively to its presence. 
On a most basic level, then, aesthetic idealism in Kant is simply a species 
of the more comprehensive transcendental idealism. The reasoning is 
straightforward. According to transcendental idealism, everything we 
experience has being only relative to the human mind. Now among the 
55 
things we experience are objects that are subsequently the target of some 
affective, aesthetic attitude. Hence, those objects to be apprehended aes 
thetically have being only relative to the universal human conditions of 
experience. No matter whether I consider the rose a merely agreeable, a 
beautiful, or even a disagreeable object, as an object that I can encounter in 
experience the rose is not a thing in itself but merely an appearance, whose 
being is relative to human cognitive conditions. 
Yet, a case can be made for attributing to Kant a more specific idealism 
regarding aesthetic matters, a specifically aesthetic idealism. The aesthetic 
determinations or predicates attributed to such objects as roses are not rela 
tive to the human cognitive conditions, but rather to the human conditions 
regarding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, which are the basic affec 
tive conditions. Aesthetic determinations themselves do not result from 
acts of taking cognizance of objects, although they may presuppose such 
acts. Aesthetic predication involves acts of taking pleasure or displeasure in 
objects. Thus a distinction is introduced between two kinds of predicates 
attributed to things like roses. On the one hand, there are the cognitive 
determinations made by the senses and the understanding. For the 
example of the rose, the cognitive determinations would include the rose's 
shape and size but also its color, even its scent. On the other hand, there 
are the aesthetic determinations that articulate the mind's affective reac 
tion to some or all of those perceived cognitive determinations. It is an act 
of cognition to ascertain that the rose has this particular shade of red. But 
it is a non-cognitive, an aesthetic matter to undergo a feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure upon considering the rose's color. 
Both sets of determinations just distinguished are predicated of objects 
only relative to some basic mental capacity. In the case of cognitive predi 
cates, the faculty in question is that of knowing. It is due to the human 
cognitive constitution that objects of experience appear with the deter 
minations that we attribute to them. Analogously, it is due to the human 
affective, aesthetic constitution that objects appear to us as pleasurable or 
displeasurable. The thing in itself that corresponds to the rose is as little 
pleasure-like as it is red. The thing in question only appears red, due to our 
human forms of knowing ?and it only appears pleasant, due to our human 
ways of feeling. 
So far the emphasis has been on the parallelism between cognitive and 
aesthetic idealism. There is also, though, a certain disanalogy between the 
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two kinds of idealism. The predication of aesthetic determinations, such as 
"agreeable" or "beautiful," is significantly more subjective than the predi 
cation of cognitive properties. In the cognitive attitude the mind focusses 
on the determinations that belong to the empirical object under considera 
tion. It is an objective fact that a certain object is round, red, and sweet or 
square, green, and bitter. By contrast, in the aesthetic attitude the mind 
focusses on its own affective stand toward some object. The aesthetic judg 
ment is primarily about the mind's own affective state. Thus a strong sub 
jective component enters into aesthetic judgments. The affective reaction to 
the same objective state of affairs, e.g., the redness of the rose, can vary 
widely from one individual to another. Finding something agreeable is no 
indication that everyone else will have the same aesthetic response. 
Given the basic subjectivity of aesthetic judgments, Kant's aesthetic 
idealism seems to take on distinctly egoistic and solipsistic overtones. To 
an aesthetic egoist, finding something pleasurable is not due to some uni 
versal human mode of experiencing pleasure but only to specific, even 
highly individualistic conditions for undergoing states of pleasure. For the 
vast 
majority of aesthetic judgments, this is indeed Kant's considered view 
on the matter. Kant would concede that cultural communalities and other 
forms of social conditioning bring about a fair amount of agreement 
among our aesthetic responses. But for the majority of cases, Kant does 
not 
acknowledge any principle that would guide the aesthetic judgments 
of different individuals and would assure their agreement on aesthetic 
matters. 
The two kinds of aesthetic judgments that Kant seeks to exempt from 
aesthetic egoism are judgments concerning the beautiful and judgments 
concerning the sublime. The status of the sublime depends on extra 
aesthetic considerations and can be disregarded in an assessment of Kant's 
aesthetic idealism. In arguing for the special status of the beautiful Kant 
employs a distinction between the pleasure we take in sensation and the 
pleasure we take in perceptual form, especially in spatial configurations. 
Kant argues that the pleasure taken in perceptual form originates in the 
mind's focus on that form or shape. The mind's attention to perceptual 
form becomes aesthetically efficacious when an object's perceptual form is 
successfully considered with regard to that form's generic suitability for 
enabling the work of cognition. The object's aesthetically relevant form is 
its purposiveness, understood as its suitability for engaging the cognitive 
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faculties apart from any particular cognitive goal. 
According to Kant's psychology of aesthetic experience, the purposive, 
harmonious engagement of the cognitive faculties gives rise to an experience 
of pleasure. This pleasure is taken in the object's spatial or temporal form, 
and the object successfully considered by such aesthetic reflection is termed 
"beautiful." By contrast, the pleasure taken in mere sensations occurs with 
out any such reflection and therefore does not bring into play any distinctly 
cognitive processes. The pleasure brought about by sensation is, in Kant's 
terminology, pleasure taken in the merely "agreeable," and must not be 
confused with the pleasure taken in the beautiful that arises from the consid 
eration of perceptual form. 
Kant's analysis of beauty thus amounts to what could be termed a formal 
aesthetic idealism, a view that maintains the ideality of the formal pur 
posiveness of certain aesthetic phenomena. The formal purposiveness is 
not a 
cognitive determination of the object, one that could be perceived in 
the way the spatio-temporal form of an object can be perceived. Rather, it 
is the product resulting from the mind's reflection on the object's percep 
tual form. The perceptual form has empirical reality. By contrast, the pur 
posive form is ideal or has being only relative to the playful engagement of 
the cognitive capacities and the resultant affective reaction to it. 
By identifying a certain kind of aesthetic experience through its poten 
tial for satisfying the most general conditions of knowing, Kant has 
reintroduced a link between the cognitive and the aesthetic spheres. It 
must be kept in mind, though, that the aesthetic judgments concerning 
beauty do not make any specific cognitive claims above their objects. They 
merely express an object's general suitability to being grasped in the cogni 
tive attitude. One might want to say that the aesthetic attitude provides a 
playful, disengaged parody of the cognitive process. 
The mimicking relation between cognitive and aesthetic judgments just 
outlined is of the highest strategic importance for Kant's attempt to estab 
lish some form of objectivity even in the realm of the aesthetic, that para 
digmatic realm of individualistic subjectivity. In exhibiting the psycho 
logical conditions appropriate for cognitive judgments, aesthetic judg 
ments about the beautiful partake, at least to some degree, in the objectiv 
ity of cognitive judgments. Kant argues that the harmonious relation 
between the faculties engaged in cognition is the same in all human beings 
and that an aesthetic judgment based on that harmony could therefore 
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claim to express an affective stand which can be shared by everyone else. 
Kant has to concede, though, that the analogy between cognitive and 
aesthetic objectivity is not complete. Unlike cognitive judgments, judg 
ments about beauty do not have an objective, object-based ground that 
provides a determinate content for the predicate of the judgment in ques 
tion. Rather, the ground of judgments concerning beauty is conceptually 
undetermined and based on the subject's feelings. Accordingly, judgments 
concerning beauty express their claim to everyone's consent not as an 
argumentatively enforceable claim but as an appeal to an ideal standard. 
Following eighteenth-century usage, Kant gives this standard the name 
"taste," and terms judgments concerning beauty "judgments of taste." 
This, then, would be yet another meaning that the term "aesthetic ideal 
ism" assumes in Kant: agreement is an ideal norm, to be pursued for the 
purpose of regulating aesthetic discourse, with no guarantee to factual 
agreement?but with good reasons for seeking it by way of sustained aes 
thetic ??agreement. 
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